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Recent years have seen important developments in the antidis-
crimination case law of the European Court of Human Rights and the
European Committee on Social Rights. While the latter has always
been a privileged European forum for discrimination monitoring and,
when applicable, for discrimination-based collective complaints (with
a third of its decisions to date raising discrimination issues), the for-
mer has also developed an interesting albeit more marginal
antidiscrimination case law and has issued a series of crucial deci-
sions in the last five years or so. The purpose of this Article is to assess
and compare the take of the two leading human rights bodies of the
Council of Europe and their complementary and mutually reinforcing
approaches, by situating them within the broader context of substan-
tive changes in antidiscrimination law in the European Union. The
two European institutions’ respective case law is analyzed with a spe-
cial emphasis on their conceptions of discrimination, their tests and
reasoning, and in particular by reference to their case law on disabil-
ity and the education rights of Roma children. One of the major
developments to be discussed is the emergence and consolidation of a
collective conception of discrimination by both bodies that is unprece-
dented in Europe, especially through their case law on indirect and
structural discrimination and on enforcing positive duties and in par-
ticular positive action. While there are still important differences
between the two bodies’ approaches, their growing body of reference
jurisprudence shows interesting signs of convergence and cross-fertili-
zation. As a matter of fact, the enhanced coordination between the
ECtHR’s and the ECSR’s approaches to non-discrimination has be-
come legally necessary since the entry into force of Protocol 12 to the
European Convention on Human Rights and the extension of the ma-
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terial scope of the ECHR non-discrimination principle to include all
the rights entailed in the European Social Charter.
“The Court observes that the applicants raised the same
complaints under Articles 12 and 13 of the European Social
Charter. It notes that their allegations do not disclose any
appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms guaran-
teed by the Convention and its Protocols. It would also point
out that it is not its task to review governments’ compliance
with instruments other than the European Convention on
Human Rights and its Protocols, even if, like other interna-
tional treaties, the European Social Charter (which, like the
Convention itself, was drawn up within the Council of Eu-
rope) may provide it with a source of inspiration.” (ECtHR,
Zehnalova and Zehnal v. The Czech Republic Application No
38621/97, Decision of 14 May 2002, emphasis added).
“This normative partnership between the two instruments is
underscored by the Committee’s emphasis on human dig-
nity. In Collective Complaint FIDH v. France (No. 14/2003)
it stated that ‘human dignity is the fundamental value and
indeed the core of positive European human rights law –
whether under the European Social Charter or under the
European Convention of Human Rights [ . . . ].’ ” (ECSR, Con-
clusions XVII-2, Vol. 1, 2005, General Introduction, pt 5,
emphasis added).
INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen important developments in the antidis-
crimination case law of two of the Council of Europe’s human rights
monitoring bodies: the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR),
that has monitored the application of the 1950 European Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR) since 1959, and the European Committee
on Social Rights (ECSR), that has been in charge of the application of
the 1961 and the 1996 European Social Charter (ESC) since respec-
tively 1961 and 1996.1 While the latter has always been a privileged
European forum for discrimination monitoring and, when applicable,
for discrimination-based collective complaints (with a third of its de-
cisions to date raising discrimination issues), the former has recently
developed, after a period of stagnation in the area, a larger and
bolder, albeit altogether more marginal, antidiscrimination case law
(with half of its decisions on the violation of the non-discrimination
1. The present articles refers to “systems” or “regimes” interchangeably, and in a
loose sense, to identify a separate ensemble of European human rights norms and
their interpretation by their respective monitoring bodies.
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principle issued in the last five years) and has issued a series of cru-
cial decisions in that context. To a large extent, these developments
have been mutually responsive and convergent. This has been the
case, for instance, with regard to the emerging notions of collective
indirect discrimination and remedial positive duties, in particular in
the Roma context.
Interestingly, those two regimes’ relative importance in the field
of European antidiscrimination law at large2 does not reflect, and in
fact is actually diametrically opposed to, that of their human rights
case law and, more generally, their overall perceived influence on the
protection of human rights in Europe. Whereas the ECHR has influ-
enced domestic human rights protection in a decisive fashion since
the 1960s, mostly through the ECtHR’s case law, respect for the ESC
and the “revitalized” role of the ECSR are more recent and date back
to the revision of the ESC in 1996.3 This two-speed human rights sys-
tem, with the social rights regimes lagging behind, reflected the post-
1945 divide between international civil and political rights on the one
hand, and social rights on the other (and the separation of the two
UN Covenants), and, more generally, the post-war opposition be-
tween the political and the social.4 Since the beginning, however,
equality and non-discrimination have been at the core of the ECSR’s
jurisprudence, whereas their development in the ECtHR’s practice is
more recent and related to the development of the former. Given the
relational and hence collective or social dimension of equality,5 its
foundational role in each and every human right guarantee6 and, ac-
cordingly, its bridging function between civil and social rights, it
should come as no surprise that it is in the field of antidiscrimination
law on which the two European bodies are now most visibly
converging.7
2. On European non-discrimination law lato sensu, see, e.g., OLIVIER DE SCHUT-
TER, THE PROHIBITION OF DISCRIMINATION UNDER EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW –
RELEVANCE FOR EU RACIAL AND EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY DIRECTIVES (2005); European
Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and European Court of Human Rights - Coun-
cil of Europe, HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN NON-DISCRIMINATION LAW (2011).
3. On the “revitalization” of the ESC, see Olivier de Schutter, The Two Lives of
the European Social Charter, in THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER: A SOCIAL CONSTITU-
TION FOR EUROPE 11-37 (Olivier de Schutter ed., 2010).
4. See, on the social question, HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION (1963).
5. See Elizabeth S.Anderson, What is the Point of Equality? 109:2 ETHICS 287-
337 (1999); Samantha Besson, International Human Rights and Equality, in EQUAL-
ITY IN TRANSNATIONAL AND GLOBAL DEMOCRACY (E. Erman & S. Na¨sstro¨m eds., 2012
forthcoming).
6. See Samantha Besson, Human Rights and Democracy in a Global Context –
Decoupling and Recoupling, 4:1 ETHICS AND GLOBAL POLITICS 19-50 (2011).
7. See also Edouard Dubout, La Cour europe´enne des droits de l’homme et la
justice sociale – a` propos de l’e´gal acce`s a` l’e´ducation des membres d’une minorite´, 84
REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME 987-1011 (2010); J-F. Akandji-Kombe´,
Le droit a` la non-discrimination vecteur de la garantie des droits sociaux, in LE DROIT
A` LA NON-DISCRIMINATION AU SENS DE LA CONVENTION EUROPE´ENNE DES DROITS DE
L’HOMME 183-96 (F. Sudre & H. Surrel eds., 2008); Edouard Dubout, Vers une protec-
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The purpose of this Article is to assess and compare the take on
equality and discrimination of those two Council of Europe’s human
rights bodies, by situating them within the broader context of sub-
stantive changes in antidiscrimination law in the European Union
and hence in the European legal space at large.8 Despite the histori-
cal filiation and, arguably, interdependence between the two
European human rights regimes in the Council of Europe system,9
and in spite of the latter’s mutually acknowledged complementarity
(e.g., through mutual borrowings since the late 1990s10),11 very few
tion de l’e´galite´ “collective” par la Cour europe´enne des droits de l’homme ?, 68 REVUE
TRIMESTRIELLE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME 851-83 (2006); Fre´de´ric Sudre, La protection
des droits sociaux par la Cour europe´enne des droits de l’homme: un exercice de juris-
prudence fiction?, 55 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME 755-72 (2003).
8. All twenty-seven EU Member States are indeed bound by the ECHR and the
ESC. For a systematic comparison of the concept and conceptions of equality and non-
discrimination in EU law and the ECHR, see K. Lenaerts & D. Arts, La personne et le
principe d’e´galite´ en droit communautaire et dans la Convention europe´enne de sauve-
garde des droits de l’homme et des liberte´s fondamentales, in LA PERSONNE HUMAINE,
SUJET DE DROIT, QUATRIE`MES JOURNE´ES RENE´ SAVATIER 101-34 (1994); R. HERNU,
PRINCIPE D’E´GALITE´ ET PRINCIPE DE NON-DISCRIMINATION DANS LA JURISPRUDENCE DE LA
COUR DE JUSTICE DES COMMUNAUTE´S EUROPE´ENNES (2003); DE SCHUTTER, supra note 2;
D. MARTIN, EGALITE´ ET NON-DISCRIMINATION DANS LA JURISPRUDENCE COMMUNAUTAIRE
– ETUDE CRITIQUE A` LA LUMIE`RE D’UNE APPROCHE COMPARATISTE (2006); Mark Bell, The
Relationship between EU law and Protocol No. 12, in NON-DISCRIMINATION: A HUMAN
RIGHT 65-70 (2006); N. Bamforth, Prohibited Grounds of Discrimination under EU
Law and the European Convention on Human Rights: Problems of Contrast and Over-
lap, 9 THE CAMBRIDGE YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LEGAL STUDIES 1-42 (2006-2007); D.
Martin, Strasbourg, Luxembourg et la discrimination: influences croise´es ou jurispru-
dences sous influence?, 69 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME 107-34
(2007); Samantha Besson, Never Shall the Twain Meet? Gender Discrimination under
EU and ECHR Law, 8:3 HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW 647-82 (2008). For the same
comparison, but between EU law and the ESC, see Olivier de Schutter, The Role of the
European Social Charter in the Development of the Law of the European Union, in
THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER: A SOCIAL CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE 95-146 (Olivier
de Schutter ed., 2010); Mark Bell, Walking in the Same Direction?: The Contribution
of the European Social Charter and the European Union to Combating Discrimina-
tion, in SOCIAL RIGHTS IN EUROPE 261-78 (Gra´inne de Bu´rca & Bruno de Witte eds.,
2005) [hereinafter Walking]; Gerard Quinn, The European Social Charter and EU
Antidiscrimination Law in the Field of Disability: Two Gravitational Fields with one
Common Purpose, in SOCIAL RIGHTS IN EUROPE 279-304 (Gra´inne de Bu´rca & Bruno
de Witte eds., 2005).
9. On their historical complementarity, see J-F. Akandji-Kombe´, The European
Social Charter and the European Convention of Human Rights: Prospects for the Next
Ten Years, in LA CHARTE SOCIALE EUROPE´ENNE: UNE CONSTITUTION SOCIALE POUR
L’EUROPE 147-65 (Olivier de Schutter ed., 2010); R. Brillat, Le principe de non-dis-
crimination dans la jurisprudence du Comite´ europe´en des droits sociaux, in LE
PRINCIPE DE NON-DISCRIMINATION FACE AUX INE´GALITE´S DE TRAITEMENT ENTRE LES PER-
SONNES DANS L’UNION EUROPE´ENNE, SEPTIE`MES JOURNE´ES D’ETUDES DU POˆLE
EUROPE´EN JEAN MONNET 407-24, 409-11 (L. Potvin-Solis ed., 2010). See also ECSR,
Complaint No 14/2003, FIDH v. France, Sept. 8, 2004, at paras. 27-29.
10. See, e.g., on the ESC as a “source of inspiration” in the ECtHR’s case law:
Sidabras and Dziautas v. Lithuania 2004-VIII; (2006) 42 EHRR 6, para. 47; Botta v.
Italia 1998-I; (1998) 26 EHRR 241, at para. 28; Zehnalova and Zehnal v. the Czech
Republic 2002-V; Application No 38621/97, Decision of May 14, 2002, 12-13. See, e.g.,
on the ECHR as situated in a “normative partnership” with the ESC in the ECSR’s
conclusions and decisions: ECSR, Conclusions XVII-2, Vol. 1, 2005, General Introduc-
tion, pt 5; ECSR, Complaint No 13/2002, Autisme-Europe v. France, Nov. 4, 2003,
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authors have systematically compared their respective antidis-
crimination regimes and their mutual reinforcement over the last few
years.12 Given the new developments in both institutions’ antidis-
crimination case law,13 and especially “the new life”14 instilled in the
ESC and the ECSR, but also their increasing impact on EU antidis-
crimination law,15 it is important to shed some light on the
progressive consolidation of the two antidiscrimination regimes but
also on their differences. This should help minimize potential contra-
dictions between the two institutions and their jurisprudence,16 as
well as possibly encourage joint interpretations in the future.
(2004) 11 IHRR 843, para. 52; Complaint No 15/2003, ERRC v. Greece, Dec. 8, 2005,
(2006) 13 IHRR 895, para. 25; Complaint No 53/2008, FEANTSA v. Slovenia, Sept. 8,
2009, para. 33; Complaint No 58/2009, COHRE v. Italy, June 25, 2010, at paras. 129
and 155.
11. On their mutual borrowings, see Sudre, supra note 7; DE SCHUTTER, supra
note 2; G. Malinverni, La Cour europe´enne des droits de l’homme et le Comite´ europe´en
des droits sociaux: rapprochements et convergences, in NEUE HERAUSFORDERUNGEN
UND PERSPEKTIVEN FUR¨ DEN SCHUTZ DER MENSCHENRECHTE: KOLLOQUIUM ZU EHREN
VON PROFESSOR DR. LUZIUS WILDHABER 3-13 (S. Breitenmoser et al. eds., 2008); J-P.
Costa, La Cour europe´enne des droits de l’homme et la protection des droits sociaux, 84
REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME 207-16 (2010) (from the ECtHR per-
spective); and Akandji-Kombe´, supra note 9; Colm O’Cinneide, Social Rights and the
European Social Charter – New Challenges and Fresh Opportunities, in THE EURO-
PEAN SOCIAL CHARTER: A SOCIAL CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE 167-83 (Olivier de
Schutter ed., 2010); Holly Cullen, The Collective Complaints System of the European
Social Charter: Interpretative Methods of the European Committee of Social Rights, 9
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW 61-93 (2009) (from the ECSR perspective).
12. There are exceptions, of course, albeit not focusing on discrimination espe-
cially: see, e.g., Akandji-Kombe´, supra note 9; O’Cinneide, supra note 11; Malinverni,
supra note 11; F. Benoıˆt-Rohmer, De l’impact de la Convention europe´enne des droits
de l’homme sur la juridictionnalisation du Comite´ europe´en des droits sociaux, in LES
DROITS SOCIAUX DANS LES INSTRUMENTS EUROPE´ENS ET INTERNATIONAUX 235-52 (N.
Aliprantis ed., 2008).
13. On the ESC non-discrimination regime, see, e.g., Brillat, supra note 9; Mark
Bell, Combating Discrimination through Collective Complaints under the European
Social Charter, in LA CHARTE SOCIALE EUROPE´ENNE: UNE CONSTITUTION SOCIALE POUR
L’EUROPE 39-48 (Olivier de Schutter ed., 2010); DE SCHUTTER, supra note 2; Olivier de
Schutter, The Contribution of the European Social Charter to the Integration of Roma
in Europe, in THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER: A SOCIAL CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE
49-78 (Olivier de Schutter ed., 2010). On the ECHR non-discrimination regime, see,
e.g., ODDNY´ MJO¨LL ANARDOTTIR, EQUALITY AND NON-DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE EURO-
PEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2003); LE DROIT A` LA NON-DISCRIMINATION AU
SENS DE LA CONVENTION EUROPE´ENNE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME: ACTES DU COLLOQUE
DES 9 ET 10 NOVEMBRE 2007 (F. Sudre ed., 2008); F. Tulkens, L’e´volution du principe
de non-discrimination a` la lumie`re de la jurisprudence de la Cour europe´enne des
droits de l’homme, in L’E´TRANGER FACE AU DROIT 193-210 (Y. Carlier ed., 2010).
14. De Schutter, supra note 3, at 37.
15. Of course, EU non-discrimination law also affects the ECtHR’s (e.g., indirect
discrimination) and the ECSR’s case law (e.g., burden of proof), but I will not expand
on those reverse influences in this article. See e.g., DE SCHUTTER, supra note 2; Euro-
pean Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and European Court of Human Rights -
Council of Europe, supra note 2.
16. On those contradictions, see Akandji-Kombe´, supra note 9; Sudre, supra
note 7.
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While their growing body of reference jurisprudence can be use-
fully compared in substance, there are important structural
differences between the two European human rights institutions’ ap-
proaches that condition the way in which they understand equality
and non-discrimination and which therefore affect how one may en-
courage mutual borrowings between them.
First of all, while the ESC’s material guarantees are primarily
social and collective both regarding their content and the right-hold-
ers, the rights guaranteed by the ECHR are primarily civil and
political as well as individual. Second, the two conventions differ in
the degree of autonomy of their respective non-discrimination
clauses: whereas both Article E ESC and Article 14 ECHR are sub-
sidiary to other rights, Protocol 12 ECHR guarantees a self-standing
non-discrimination principle. Third, while the ESC only binds forty-
three States, split between those that have ratified its 1961 version
(twelve) and its 1996 version (thirty-one)—which is itself an a` la
carte treaty that does not require the ratification of all its provi-
sions—the ECHR currently has forty-seven States Parties that have
all ratified the same text. Fourth, the ESC has a restricted scope of
right-holders and in principle does not apply to third-country nation-
als, whereas the ECHR protects any person or group of persons under
the jurisdiction of its States Parties. A fifth difference lies in the two
conventions’ monitoring system. Whereas the 1996 ESC is monitored
by a non-judicial17 committee of independent experts, the ECSR,
through both a state reporting system and a collective complaint
mechanism that may be triggered by trade unions, employers’ as-
sociations and non-governmental organizations, the ECHR
monitoring is ensured by the ECtHR through a judicial complaint
mechanism initiated by an individual or a state application. Unlike
the ECtHR, the ECSR collective complaint mechanism requires
neither an individual nor a concrete case of violation nor is the admis-
sibility of a complaint conditioned by the exhaustion of local
remedies. It may therefore be used to directly target general legisla-
tion and policies that affect groups,18 even though this also means
that, unlike under the ECHR, there is no individual remedy for con-
crete violations of the Charter before the Committee. Furthermore,
the ESC reporting system enables the collection of (especially statis-
tical) data, that may be used in the collective complaint mechanism,
17. Although the ECSR is not strictly a judicial organ, it works as a quasi-judicial
one to the extent that its members are independent from governments and it issues
decisions on complaints that have gradually constituted a body of jurisprudence and
precedents.
18. See, e.g., Robin R. Churchill & Urfan Khaliq, The Collective Complaints Sys-
tem of the European Social Charter: An Effective Mechanism for Ensuring Compliance
with Economic and Social Rights?, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 417-56 (2004); Akandji-Kombe´,
supra note 7; Cullen, supra note 11; Bell, supra note 13.
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thus enabling important synergies between the political and the
quasi-judicial processes, a feature lacking in the ECtHR’s system. Fi-
nally, the enforcement mechanisms available to follow-up on the
ECSR’s conclusions or decisions are limited by contrast to the
ECtHR’s binding judgments and the new enforcement powers under
Protocol 14 ECHR.
In this Article, the case law of both European human rights bod-
ies are compared directly and in an integrated fashion rather than
first presented in turn and then compared. Interestingly, both the
ESC and the ECtHR have started theorizing and systematizing their
respective antidiscrimination regimes, thus making this integrated
comparison easier. A choice of constitutive elements from both re-
gimes or from either had to be made therefore in order to assess the
treatment of these elements by both regimes. Of course, the presenta-
tion cannot be entirely impervious to theoretical considerations about
antidiscrimination law, and it entails a systematization element that
enables the identification of gaps or inconsistencies in the two re-
gimes. The comparison consists mostly of the two institutions’ case
law (decisions on collective complaints and conclusions on periodic
State reports for the ECSR and judicial decisions on individual appli-
cations for the ECtHR) regarding their respective guarantees of the
non-discrimination principle.
The structure of the Article is three-pronged. After a general
presentation of the concepts and conceptions of equality and non-dis-
crimination in the ECHR and the ESC systems in the first section,
their respective regimes are compared in the second one. The third
section focuses on special features of non-discrimination regimes, and
especially on one specific dimension of antidiscrimination law in the
Council of Europe, i.e., the collective and positive conception of dis-
crimination that has emerged and consolidated in both the ECtHR’s
and the ECSR’s case law and that is gradually being exported into
EU antidiscrimination law.
I. EQUALITY AND NON-DISCRIMINATION
In order to understand how the principle of non-discrimination is
regulated under the ESC and the ECHR, it is important to examine
the relationship between equality and non-discrimination in general
in both legal regimes. The principle of non-discrimination ought first
to be distinguished from the principle of equality, before its definition
and role can be assessed in the respective legal orders.
A. The Relationship between Equality and Non-discrimination
When studying the principle of non-discrimination in a given le-
gal regime, the first question is its relationship to the principle of
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equality.19 Generally speaking, equality and non-discrimination are
held to be positive and negative statements of the same principle.20
One is treated equally when one is not discriminated against and one
is discriminated against when one is not treated equally.
Whereas traditional international law used not to concern itself
with discrimination, except in relation to sovereignty, the Second
World War triggered an unprecedented concern for human rights
protection which led to guaranteeing them for all without discrimina-
tion. From the 1950s onwards, conventional guarantees of the non-
discrimination principle multiplied. It is now one of the most fre-
quently protected principles of international human rights law. It is
often guaranteed in form of a general non-discrimination clause in
the enjoyment of human rights,21 but also sometimes as an indepen-
dent principle of non-discrimination.22 It is rarer, however, to find
international legal guarantees of the principle of equality before and
in the law.23 Both the ECHR and the ESC law are somewhat special
in this respect: they protect both principles as two sides of the same
coin.24
Since 1950, Article 14 ECHR25 has guaranteed non-discrimina-
tion in the exercise of other rights in the Convention.26 It was
initially conceived as a minimal clause, subsidiary to national consti-
tutional equal protection clauses (see Article 53 ECHR). Article 14
ECHR has now been complemented by Protocol 12 which entered into
19. See Christopher McCrudden, Equality and Non-Discrimination, in ENGLISH
PUBLIC LAW ch. 11 (David Feldman ed., 2004).
20. See Anne Bayefsky, The Principle of Equality or Non-discrimination in Inter-
national Law, 11 HUM. RTS. Q. 5-19 (1990). For a critique of the relationship between
non-discrimination and equality, see Elisa Holmes, Antidiscrimination Rights with-
out Equality, 68 MOD. L. REV. 175-94 (2005); Besson, supra note 5.
21. See, e.g., Article 2 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217 A
(III), UN Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948); Article 2(1) and 3 UN International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS 171; Article 2(2) UN International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 993 UNTS 3.
22. See, e.g., Article 26 UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
999 UNTS 171.
23. See, e.g., Article 7 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217 A
(III), UN Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948); or Article 26 UN International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, 999 UNTS 171.
24. Given their relationship in the case law of both European bodies, I will not
attempt to severe the link between the two in my presentation of the two regimes and
their judicial interpretations.
25. Article 14 ECHR reads as follows: “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms
set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground
such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”
26. See S. Livingstone, Article 14 and the Prevention of Discrimination in the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights, 2 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 25-34 (1997); Luzius
Wildhaber, Protection against Discrimination under the European Convention on
Human Rights – A Second-class Guarantee?, 2 BALTIC YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 71-82 (2002). See also THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS at 1027 (Peter van Dijk et al. eds., 2006).
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force in 2005.27 This optional protocol establishes, for those eighteen
Contracting Parties which have ratified it to date, a principle of
equality before and in the law.28 The Contracting Parties only consti-
tute a third of the Council of Europe’s Member States, but for them
the ECHR guarantees both the principle of non-discrimination and
that of equality.29
The principle of non-discrimination has been protected by the
ESC from the beginning, albeit not explicitly in a general equality or
non-discrimination clause outside the 1961 Charter’s Preamble. It is
important, however, to distinguish between the antidiscrimination
regime of the 1961 Charter and that of the 1996 Revised ESC.30 Al-
though the 1961 Charter already imposed (beyond its Preamble) a
protection from all forms of discrimination in employment under the
right to work (Article 1, para. 2),31 the revision of the Charter in 1996
improved that protection beyond the sphere of employment. This has
been done, on the one hand, by inserting an explicit and general non-
discrimination clause at Article E32 among the horizontal clauses of
the Charter that apply to all substantive guarantees and, on the
other, by adding two specific provisions aimed at the integration and
social protection of persons with disabilities (Article 15, para. 3) and
of elderly persons (Article 23). The ECSR reads both of those specific
27. According to the ECtHR, Article 14 ECHR and Article 1(1) Protocol 12 have
the same meaning: see Sejdic and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina Application No
27996/06; 34836/06, Judgment of Dec. 22, 2009, at para. 55.
28. Article 1 Protocol 12 reads as follows:
Article 1 – General prohibition of discrimination 1 The enjoyment of any
right set forth by law shall be secured without discrimination on any ground
such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, na-
tional or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or
other status. 2 No one shall be discriminated against by any public authority
on any ground such as those mentioned in paragraph 1.
See van Dijk et al., supra note 26, at 989; Robert Wintemute, Filling the Article 14
“Gap”: Government Ratification and Judicial Control of Protocol No. 12 ECHR, 4 EUR.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 484-99 (2004). See also S. AGIRBASLI, VOM AKZESSORISCHEN DIS-
KRIMINIERUNGSVERBOT ZUM ALLGEMEINEN GLEICHHEITSGEBOT: EINE UNTERSUCHUNG
U¨BER DIE MO¨GLICHEN RECHTSWIRKUNGEN DES AM 1. APRIL 2005 MITTLERWEILE FU¨R 15
MITGLIEDSTAATEN IN KRAFT GETRETENEN 12. ZUSATZPROTOKOLLS ZUR EUROPA¨ISCHEN
KONVENTION FU¨R MENSCHENRECHTE (2008).
29. See, e.g., Urfan Khaliq, Protocol 12 to the European Convention on Human
Rights: A Step Forward or a Step Too Far?, PUBLIC LAW 457-64 (2001).
30. Unless specified otherwise, I will refer to the ESC as the 1996 Revised Euro-
pean Social Charter.
31. See e.g., Conclusions XVI-1, Vol. 2, 2002 (Luxembourg), Article 1, para. 2, p.
377-80.
32. Article E 1996 ESC reads as follows: “The enjoyment of the rights set forth in
this Charter shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as race, col-
our, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national extraction or social
origin, health, association with a national minority, birth or other status.” In what
follows, unless specified otherwise, I will concentrate on Article E’s general non-dis-
crimination clause and will not address the other self-standing non-discrimination
rights and principles in the Charter.
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provisions as requiring the introduction of non-discrimination legisla-
tion and effective measures protecting persons against
discrimination on grounds of disability and age.33
Interestingly, the principle of equality, and especially of equal
treatment, is also protected by the 1996 ESC. This is done through
free-standing rights, on the one hand, albeit by reference to a special
ground of discrimination each time (e.g., sex, race or nationality); it is
the case, for instance, for Article 20 and the right to equal opportuni-
ties and equal treatment in matters of employment and occupation
without discrimination on the grounds of sex, but also for Articles 19
and 27. On the other hand, the ECSR regularly expresses the idea
that the ESC non-discrimination regime aims at ensuring “real and
effective equality”34 more generally and considers it as one of the es-
sential values of the Charter.35
B. The Principle of Non-discrimination
Although non-discrimination is a dominant and recurrent princi-
ple or right36 within international human rights instruments, the
principle is never defined in a single and uniform fashion. Nor do
most of its guarantees provide a clear delineation of its scope.37 Un-
surprisingly, given their common origins in the Council of Europe,
the ECHR and the ESC do not diverge too much with respect to both
the definition and the scope they give to the non-discrimination
principle.38
Article 14 ECHR does not create an additional right not to be
discriminated,39 but merely a principle which applies when the case
at hand falls within the ambit of other rights in the Convention (“ac-
33. See, e.g., Conclusions 2003, Vol. 1 (France), Article 15, p. 170; Conclusions
2003, Vol. 1 (Italy), Article 15, p. 314.
34. See Complaint No 13/2002, Autisme-Europe v. France, Nov. 4, 2003, (2004) 11
IHRR 843, at para. 52.
35. See Complaint No 58/2009, COHRE v. Italy, June 25, 2010, at para. 78.
36. Scope precludes addressing the vexed question of the nature of non-discrimi-
nation qua human right in this paper. As I have argued elsewhere, however, there
cannot be a human right to a value, and human rights and equality are better under-
stood as distinct norms that are in creative tension with each other than subsumed
under the human rights concept. Arguably, the latter is founded in equal moral status
and equal moral status is realized through individual human rights. However, the
principle of equality may also protect individuals in the absence of human rights’ vio-
lations. The general and specific functions of non-discrimination clauses within
international and European human rights instruments I alluded to before actually
confirm this approach. See Besson, supra note 5.
37. See Bayefsky, supra note 20, at 34.
38. See, e.g., L. Potvin-Solis, La liaison entre le principe de non-discrimination et
les liberte´s et droits fondamentaux des personnes dans les jurisprudences europe´ennes,
80 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME 967-1005 (2009).
39. See, e.g., P. Lambert, La porte´e de l’article 14 de la Convention europe´enne des
droits de l’homme, 17 REVUE HELLE´NIQUE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME 59-68 (2003).
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cessory” character of the principle).40 Of course, the scope of the
ECHR extends beyond the actual letter of the rights guaranteed; to
invoke it, it is sufficient that the facts of the case broadly relate to
issues that are protected under those rights.41 Although these rights
need not be violated for Article 14 ECHR to be invoked (“autonomy”
of the principle),42 its violation will not be examined by the Court
when other rights in the Convention are actually regarded as being
violated (“subsidiarity” of the principle).43 The only exceptions made
by the ECtHR are cases of “clear inequality of treatment,”44 although
this criterion remains vague.45
To be sure, Protocol 12 ECHR has guaranteed an independent
and general non-discrimination principle since 2005, at least for
those eighteen Contracting Parties which have ratified it. That prin-
ciple may be directly invoked, independently from another right in
the Convention or in domestic law,46 and it may be regarded as vio-
lated by the European Court even when other ECHR rights are
violated as well. Yet, the recent case law indicates that the Court
does not assess whether Protocol 12 has been violated if Article 14 is
deemed applicable and violated.47 Even though Protocol 12 does not
formulate the principle as a human right stricto sensu, that principle
may be invoked like any other right in the Convention. So far, the
relatively low number of ratifications of the protocol and the limited
number of cases of application (two to date) temper its relevance in
the ECtHR’s non-discrimination regime.
Given the intricate history of the two European human rights
instruments, it should come as no surprise that Article E 1996 ESC
40. See Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. Royaume-Uni A 94 (1985); (1985) 7
EHRR 471, at para. 71; Petrovic v. Austria 1998-II; (2001) 33 EHRR 14, at para. 29;
Sidabras and Dziautas v. Lithuania 2004-VIII; (2006) 42 EHRR 6, at paras. 47-48. See
P. Lambert, Vers une e´volution de l’interpre´tation de l’article 14 de la Convention
europe´enne des droits de l’homme?, 35 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME
497-505 (1998). See, however, Wintemute, supra note 28, at 366-82, arguing, by refer-
ence to Thlimmenos v. Greece 2000-IV; (2001) 31 EHRR 15, at para. 42, that the fact
that the ground of discrimination falls within the ambit of a Convention right is
enough to apply Article 14. See also Aaron Baker, The Enjoyment of Rights and Free-
doms: a New Conception of the “Ambit” under Article 14 ECHR, 69 MOD. L. REV. 714-
37 (2006).
41. See E.B. v. France (2008) 47 EHRR 522.
42. See Sommerfeld v. Germany 2003-VIII; (2004) 38 EHRR 756.
43. See Dudgeon v. United Kingdom A 45 (1981); (1982) 4 EHRR 149, at para. 69.
See Wildhaber, supra note 26.
44. See Airey v. Ireland (No1) A 32 (1979); (1979-1980) 2 EHRR 305, at para. 30.
See Lambert, supra note 40, at 501-03.
45. See Martin, supra note 8, at 112.
46. See Sejdic and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina Application No 27996/06,
Judgment of Dec. 22, 2009, at para. 51; Savez Crkava “Rijec Zivota” and Others v.
Croatia Application No 7798/08, Judgment of Dec. 9, 2010, at paras. 104-08.
47. See Sejdic and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina Application No 27996/06,
Judgment of Dec. 22, 2009, at para. 51; Savez Crkava “Rijec Zivota” and Others v.
Croatia Application No 7798/08, Judgment of Dec. 9, 2010, at paras. 114-15.
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was shaped according to Article 14 ECHR and actually replicates its
wording. As a result, its principle of non-discrimination is accessory
and dependent, and it only protects individuals and groups from dis-
crimination in the enjoyment of ESC substantive rights.48 Although a
Charter’s right need not be violated for Article E to be invoked (“au-
tonomy” of the principle),49 the latter’s violation will not be examined
by the Committee when other rights in the Charter are actually re-
garded as being violated (“subsidiarity” of the principle). In practice,
and unlike the situation regarding Article 14 ECHR, however, the
ECSR has not to date recognized a violation of Article E without a
joint violation of one of the Charter’s rights; this questions the auton-
omy of the principle.50 It remains to be seen whether the Committee
will eventually find a violation of Article E in the absence of violation
of a Charter right. Moreover, some members of the Committee have
actually recommended following the ECtHR’s practice of also apply-
ing Article 14 ECHR in case of “clear inequality of treatment” even
when other ECHR rights have also been violated.51 Some ECSR deci-
sions, indeed, do not explore the existence of discrimination in
addition to another breach of the Charter.52 Although there are plans
to introduce an equivalent to Protocol 12 ECHR in the Charter, they
are unlikely to bear fruit before the first assessments of that proto-
col’s success are made within the ECHR system.
Because the principle of non-discrimination is so closely con-
nected to every right in the Charter, it is sometimes considered a
right to non-discrimination.53 This tendency is reinforced by the co-
existence of self-standing rights to non-discrimination on certain
grounds and in certain contexts in the Charter. Moreover, Article E
imposes an obligation of result and not just of means on States Par-
ties, and this brings it closer to an individual right to non-
discrimination.54
Despite the accessory nature of the ESC and ECHR non-discrim-
ination regimes, there has been a rise in the number of cases under
both in recent years. Article 14 ECHR was only regarded as violated
in seventy-four decisions since 1968,55 with more than half of those
cases decided since 2007 when the ECtHR started addressing cases of
48. See Complaint No 13/2002, Autisme-Europe v. France, Nov. 4, 2003, (2004) 11
IHRR 843, at para. 52.
49. See Complaint No 51/2008, CEDR v. France, Oct. 19, 2009, at para. 79.
50. Brillat, supra note 9, at 420.
51. See, e.g., Dissenting opinion of Ms Kollonay, in Complaint No 48/2008, CEDR
v. Bulgaria, Feb.18, 2009.
52. See, e.g., Complaint No 14/2003, FIDH v. France, Sept. 8, 2004.
53. See, e.g., Brillat, supra note 9, at 409.
54. See Complaint No 1/1998, ICJ v. Portugal, Sept. 9, 1999 (1999) 6 IHRR 1142,
para. 40. See also de Schutter, supra note 3, at 35.
55. Out of seventy-four cases, sixty-six resulted in a violation of Article 14 ECHR
on its own and eight in a violation of Article 14 ECHR combined with that of another
ECHR provision.
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indirect discrimination; Protocol 12 has been invoked only twice since
2005,56 which is a small proportion of the provisions deemed
breached by the ECtHR since the 1960s. Article E has been consid-
ered violated in a third of the decisions made by the ECSR following
collective complaints since 1996.57 That recent rise in cases indicates
a convergence between the two European human rights bodies, even
though the ECHR case law on discrimination remains small in pro-
portion to the total jurisprudence of the ECtHR.
II. THE REGIME OF NON-DISCRIMINATION
In order to understand how discrimination is prohibited under
ECHR and ESC law, it is useful to start by discussing the source and
role of the principle itself, before studying its personal and material
scope and its constitutive material and procedural elements. Unless
specified otherwise, the regime presented will be the same for all
grounds of discrimination, even though their respective treatments
have developed separately;58 when there are differences between the
regimes, an explanation will be provided.
A. Source
The principle of non-discrimination may, depending on the legal
order, be guaranteed in many different sources and it may play a very
different role from one legal order to the next. Unsurprisingly, given
their common origins in the Council of Europe’s human rights trea-
ties, that difference in terms of sources and role is not evident from a
comparison between ECHR and ESC law on discrimination, although
there are slight variations in their respective jurisprudence and
interpretation.
Discrimination on suspect grounds is prohibited under Article 14
ECHR and Protocol 12. Since the principle of non-discrimination is
still largely accessory in the Convention, it has long remained a sec-
ond-class guarantee under ECHR law.59 Of course, the ECtHR’s case
law has developed a more detailed regime of non-discrimination. All
56. Sejdic and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina Application No 27996/06, Judg-
ment of Dec. 22, 2009; Savez Crkava “Rijec Zivota” and Others v. Croatia Application
No 7798/08, Judgment of Dec. 9, 2010.
57. To date, the ECSR has issued sixty-eight decisions on collective complaints
and twenty-one of those concerned discrimination (in eleven cases, Article E was
deemed violated in combination with another right and, in eight cases, another free-
standing right to non-discrimination of the Charter was deemed violated); four collec-
tive complaints pertaining to discrimination have been declared admissible and are
awaiting a decision on the merits. Violations of Article E have only been rarely ob-
served in the context of the ECSR’s conclusions on national reports, however: see, e.g.,
Conclusions 2005, Vol. 1 (Lithuania), Article 27, at para. 1, p. 426.
58. See Bell, Walking, supra note 8, 269 ff. on gender, race and nationality in the
ECSR’s case law. See also Besson, supra note 8 on gender in the ECtHR’s case law.
59. See on Article 14 qua second-class guarantee, Wildhaber, supra note 26.
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the same, the first case of application of Article 14 ECHR to sex dis-
crimination only dates back to 1985,60 and half of the cases
pertaining to the violation of that provision have been decided since
2007. Overall, the ECtHR’s decisions pertaining to violations of Arti-
cle 14 ECHR (seventy-four altogether) remain too few relative to its
total case law to constitute a complete regime of ECHR discrimina-
tion law. Despite a recent rise in cases pertaining to Article 14 ECHR
and a tendency toward systematization, the Court’s casuistic ap-
proach in the early days has led to a regrettable lack of overall
coherence.
By contrast, even though Article E 1996 ESC also finds its source
in a laconic European human rights treaty, the ECSR’s case law has
helped shape a more systematic regime of non-discrimination, albeit
through fewer cases and over fewer years than the ECtHR. This may
be explained by the more theoretical approach taken by the ECSR
overall61 and by its dynamic and purposive interpretation of the ESC
by reference to its underlying values.62 It is also due to the ESC’s
focus on social rights and to the collective complaint mechanism that
both contribute to a better understanding of the collective dimension
of discrimination and of the various ways to combat discrimination
and promote group integration. A more contingent explanation may
also be found in the Committee’s lighter docket in terms of the total
number of States Parties and cases.
B. Scope
The personal scope of a principle refers to the group of its benefi-
ciaries and addressees, while its material scope relates to its domains
of application. Interestingly, the principle of non-discrimination has a
different personal and material scope under ECHR and ESC law as
well as in the case law of the ECtHR and the ECSR.
The personal scope of the principle as it is guaranteed in Article
14 ECHR is very broad. Like all Convention rights and principles, it
protects all physical and legal persons, as individuals or groups of
individuals and whatever their nationality, under the jurisdiction of
a State Party to the Convention (Article 34 ECHR). Following the DH
and others case that was introduced by a group of eighteen Roma
children, some observers have identified the development of a right to
collective equality held not only by individuals, but also by a group.63
60. Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. Royaume-Uni A 94 (1985); (1985) 7
EHRR 471, at para. 78.
61. On the quality of the ECSR’s reasoning, see O’Cinneide, supra note 11. For a
critique, see Akandji-Kombe´, supra note 9.
62. See Complaint No 13/2002, Autisme-Europe v. France, Nov. 4 2003, (2004) 11
IHRR 843, para. 52. On procedural borrowings of this type by the ECSR from the
ECtHR’s case law, see Malinverni, supra note 11.
63. See e.g., Dubout, Vers une protection de l’e´galite´ “collective,” supra note 7.
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Although the Court did not clearly re-conceptualize the principle of
equality as a collective one in the DH and others case, it issued a
decision of collective violation of Article 14 ECHR without assessing
the existence of violations in each applicant’s individual case.64 The
principle of non-discrimination addresses States Parties and their
authorities. Like most international human rights treaties’ provi-
sions, Article 14 ECHR does not bind individuals directly (Article 34
ECHR). Article 14 ECHR’s horizontal effect is thus at the most indi-
rect and operates via the Contracting States’ procedural duties and
their positive obligations to protect ECHR rights against both state
and individual violations.65 The same can be said of Article 1 Protocol
12. Broadly speaking, indeed, Protocol 12 prohibits discrimination in
all circumstances where public authorities are involved, but also
among individuals outside purely personal contexts and where indi-
viduals exercise functions placing them in a position to decide on how
publicly available goods and services are offered.66
By contrast, the personal scope of the non-discrimination princi-
ple in the ESC is more limited. The individuals and groups protected
by the ESC comprise the nationals of all States Parties provided they
are lawfully resident in a given State party, but they exclude third
country nationals.67 The ECSR has actually derogated from the ex-
press wording of the Charter in the context of the right to healthcare.
Here, it has considered the exclusion of third country nationals from
healthcare as treading “on a right of fundamental importance to the
individual since it is concerned with the right to life itself and goes to
the very dignity of the human being.”68 It remains unclear how the
Committee will identify and then interpret Charter rights that are
not that intimately linked to human dignity. On a positive note, the
social dimension of the rights protected and the collective complaint
mechanism enhances the collective dimension of discrimination and
helps identify vulnerable groups and measures that may prevent and
remedy discrimination more effectively and in a collective fashion.
The ESC addressees are States Parties’ institutions. It also has an
indirect horizontal effect through the States’ positive duties to pro-
64. D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC] (2008) 47 EHRR 3, at para. 97.
65. See, e.g., Pla and Puncernau v. Andorra 2004-VIII; (2006) 42 EHRR 25; Opuz
v. Turkey (2010) 50 EHRR 28, at para. 191.
66. See Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (ETS No. 177), Explanatory Report, at paras. 22 and 28,
available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/177.htm. See also
Sudre, supra note 7, at 771.
67. See Appendix to the Social Charter on its scope in terms of persons protected.
68. See Complaint No 14/2003, FIDH v. France, Sept. 8, 2004, at paras. 30-32. See
J-F. Akandji-Kombe´, The Scope of Application Ratione Personae of the European So-
cial Charter: Between Light and Shadows, in LA CHARTE SOCIALE EUROPE´ENNE: UNE
CONSTITUTION SOCIALE POUR L’EUROPE 79-93 (Oliver de Schutter ed., 2010).
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mote equality, including duties to prevent and remedy private
discriminations.69
Under Article 14 ECHR, the material scope of the principle of
non-discrimination is limited. It encompasses all areas of national
law but only if one of the Convention rights applies. The ECHR con-
tains a limited list of rights, predominantly characterized as “civil
and political.” Of course, the ECHR is increasingly used to protect
certain “economic and social” rights either directly or indirectly
through the interpretation of civil and political rights.70 As a matter
of fact, it is Article 14’s non-discrimination clause that is often in-
voked to effect a more social and collective interpretation of ECHR
rights.71 With the application of Protocol 12, the material scope of the
non-discrimination principle has broadened: here, the principle of
non-discrimination applies to all areas of domestic legal intervention
outside the material ambit of a Convention right, including in the
social context and when applying social rights.72 The ECtHR’s case
law has not yet picked up on this possibility, however, and it is too
early to tell whether Protocol 12 can work effectively as entry point
for ESC rights into the ECHR system.
Unlike its personal scope, the ESC non-discrimination principle’s
material scope is broader than that of Article 14 ECHR. It applies
indeed within the scope of all social rights protected by the Charter.
The new role that may be played by Protocol 12 ECHR in expanding
the scope of the non-discrimination principle in the social realm may
even contribute to creating more overlaps between the two institu-
tions’ case law. This may be a cause of enhanced protection for
individuals who will benefit from the ECHR protection against dis-
crimination in the social context while also being entitled to the
individual judicial remedies guaranteed by the ECHR and the full
justiciability of social rights as a result,73 but it may also call for more
coordination between the two bodies.74
69. See Oliver de Schutter, Reasonable Accommodation and Positive Obligations
in the European Convention on Human Rights, in DISABILITY RIGHTS IN EUROPE 35-63
(Anna Lawson & Caroline Gooding eds., 2005).
70. See, e.g., Sudre, supra note 7; DE SCHUTTER, supra note 2; Malinverni, supra
note 11; Costa, supra note 11. See, e.g., Andrejeva v. Latvia (App no 55707/00), Judg-
ment of Feb. 18, 2009; Gaygusuz v. Austria 1996-IV; (1997) 23 EHRR 364; Koua
Poirrez v. France 2003-X; (2005) 40 EHRR 34.
71. See also Dubout, La Cour europe´enne des droits de l’homme et la justice
sociale, supra note 7; Akandji-Kombe´, supra note 7; Dubout, Vers une protection de
l’e´galite´ “collective,” supra note 7; Sudre, supra note 7.
72. See Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (ETS No. 177), Explanatory Report, paras. 22 and 28, availa-
ble at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/177.htm. See also Sudre,
supra note 7, at 770.
73. See de Schutter, supra note 3, at 32.
74. See Sudre, supra note 7, at 774-78.
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C. Material Elements
Broadly speaking, the principle of non-discrimination precludes
treating similar situations differently and treating different situa-
tions equally unless this differential treatment is objectively
justified. While both European principles of non-discrimination could
fit this general definition, important variations arise inside each of
the constitutive material elements of discrimination. In a nutshell,
the latter are:75 an unfavorable treatment (1) of comparable cases (2)
based on a prohibited ground of discrimination (3) that cannot be ob-
jectively justified (4).
1. Unfavorable Treatment
The unfavorable treatment that constitutes the first element of a
case of discrimination consists either in the different treatment of
similar situations or in the equal treatment of different situations.
Both types of unfavorable treatment are precluded by the ECHR and
the ESC.
According to the ECtHR, “Article 14 of the Convention not only
requires that persons in a similar situation must be treated in an
equal manner but also requires that persons whose situations are sig-
nificantly different must be treated differently.”76 Article E 1996
ESC’s non-discrimination principle is interpreted by the ECSR in the
same way and is also violated “when States without an objective and
reasonable justification fail to treat differently persons whose situa-
tions are significantly different.”77
For a long time, the distinction between direct and indirect dis-
crimination was absent from the ECtHR’s case law.78 Generally
speaking, however, the definition of discrimination used by the
ECtHR was broad enough so that its notion of direct discrimination
lato sensu could be said to encompass indirect discrimination.79 It has
recently become clear from the ECtHR’s case law that both direct and
indirect discrimination are prohibited.80 According to the Hoogendijk
75. One retrieves these elements in the case law of both European institutions:
see ECtHR, Koua Poirrez v. France 2003-X; (2005) 40 EHRR 34, at para. 46; and
ECSR, Complaint No 26/2004, Syndicat des Agre´ge´s de l’Enseignement Supe´rieur
(SAGES) v. France, July 11, 2005, (2005) 41 IHRR SE 21.
76. Hoogendijk v. Netherlands (2005) 40 EHRR SE22, 206. See also Thlimmenos
v. Greece 2000-IV; (2001) 31 EHRR 15, at para. 47.
77. See Complaint No 13/2002, Autisme-Europe v. France, Nov. 4, 2003, (2004) 11
IHRR 843, para. 52; confirmed in Complaint No 58/2009, COHRE v. Italy, June 25,
2010, at paras. 19-21.
78. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 8, at 113. See, e.g., Abdulaziz, Cabales and Bal-
kandali v. Royaume-Uni A 94 (1985); (1985) 7 EHRR 471.
79. See Martin, supra note 8, at 285. See, e.g., Thlimmenos v. Greece 2000-IV;
(2001) 31 EHRR 15.
80. See, e.g., Zarb Adami v. Malte 2006-VIII; (2006) 44 EHRR 3, at paras. 78, 82-
83; DH and others v. Czech Republic [GC] (2008) 47 EHRR 3, at paras. 179-80, 187-
95; Opuz v. Turkey (2010) 50 EHRR 28, at para. 183; ECtHR, Ors˘us˘ and Others v.
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case, “where a general policy or measure has disproportionately prej-
udicial effects on a particular group, it is not excluded that this may
be regarded as discriminatory notwithstanding that it is not specifi-
cally aimed or directed at that group.”81 The constitutive elements of
indirect indiscrimination are a neutral rule, criterion or practice that
affects a group defined by a protected ground in a significantly more
negative way by comparison to others in a similar situation. The last
two elements are common to direct and indirect discriminations and
are assessed together in the remainder of the present section.
The ESC non-discrimination principle is interpreted along the
same lines by the ECSR. The Committee considers that Article E
1996 ESC not only prohibits direct discrimination, but also all its in-
direct forms.82 As a matter of fact, the ECSR’s and the ECtHR’s
decisions on indirect discrimination, and especially indirect discrimi-
nation pertaining to the rights of Roma populations, have developed
by reference to each other.83
2. Comparability of Cases
For differential treatment to be discriminatory, it needs to be
treating comparable cases differently or treating non-comparable
cases equally. If the cases are not comparable, the difference of treat-
ment does not need to be justified and is not discriminatory.
Assessing the comparability of the situations at hand is thus crucial.
Both the ECSR and the ECtHR have recognized the importance of
the comparability phase albeit in more or less elaborate way.
The ECtHR almost systematically postpones the assessment of
comparability of the situations at hand to the justification phase.84
There are a few exceptions, of course, as when the lack of comparabil-
ity is used to dismiss a case.85 Even when the Court compares the
Croatia [GC] (2011) 52 EHRR 7. See Edouard Dubout, L’interdiction des discrimina-
tions indirectes par la Cour europe´enne des droits de l’homme: re´novation ou
re´volution?, 75 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME 821-56 (2008); Gemma
Hobcraft, Roma Children and Education in the Czech Republic: DH v. Czech Repub-
lic: Opening the Door to Indirect Discrimination Findings in Strasbourg?, 2 EUROPEAN
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW 245-60 (2008); Ralph Sandland, Developing a Jurispru-
dence of Difference: The Protection of the Human Rights of Travelling Peoples by the
European Court of Human Rights, 8 HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW 475-516 (2008).
81. Hoogendijk v. Netherlands (2005) 40 EHRR SE22, 207 (my emphasis). See
also Jordan v. United Kingdom (2003) 37 EHRR 2, 154.
82. See Complaint No 13/2002, Autisme-Europe v. France, Nov. 4, 2003, (2004) 11
IHRR 843, at para. 52; confirmed in Complaint No 58/2009, COHRE v. Italy, June 25,
2010, at paras. 19-21.
83. See Complaint No 58/2009, COHRE v. Italy, June 25, 2010, para. 119, citing
ECtHR, Connors v. United Kingdom (2005) 40 EHRR 189, at para. 82.
84. See Rasmussen v. Denmark A 87 (1984); (1984) 7 EHRR 371, at para. 37. See,
however, for a more recent attempt at taking comparability more seriously: Petrov v.
Bulgaria Application No 15197/02, Judgment of May 22, 2008, at paras. 52-53; Bur-
den v. United Kingdom (2008) 47 EHRR 38, paras. 61-65.
85. Beale v. United Kingdom (2005) 40 EHRR SE6.
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situations, its test is often reduced to a minimum; the chosen compa-
rator needs to be “in an analogous or relevantly similar situation.”86
Sometimes, the Court even uses the measure of comparability as a
justification for the differential treatment, thus undermining the
whole discrimination test.87
By contrast, the ESC non-discrimination regime separates
clearly between the comparability of cases and the justification of the
differential treatment.88 The comparability test used by the ECSR is
not very elaborate, however.
3. Grounds of Discrimination
Differential treatment of comparable cases is usually only re-
garded as discriminatory if the ground on which the differential
treatment is based is prohibited. What constitutes a prohibited
ground varies between Article 14 ECHR and Article E 1996 ESC. So
does the ranking among various grounds depending on how closely
related a feature is to one’s moral status and autonomy.
Under Article 14 ECHR, the grounds mentioned are only exem-
plary and any characteristic related to one’s personality or one’s
given personal characteristics (status) may be regarded as a prohib-
ited ground.89 While nationality,90 disability,91 age,92 sexual
orientation93 and transsexuality94 were not among the grounds ex-
pressly mentioned in Article 14 ECHR, they have all been deemed
prohibited by the ECtHR—although not always directly on the basis
of Article 14 but rather under Article 8 ECHR. Interestingly, the
86. Stubbings and others v. United Kingdom 1996-IV; (1997) 23 EHRR 213; Car-
son and Others v. United Kingdom (2010) 51 EHRR 13.
87. See, e.g., Stubbings and others v. United Kingdom 1996-IV; (1997) 23 EHRR
213, at para. 74. See Aaron Baker, Comparison Tainted by Justification: Against a
‘Compendious Question’ in Article 14 Discrimination, 3 PUBLIC LAW 476-97 (2006).
88. See Complaint No 6/1999, Syndicat national des professions de tourisme v.
France, Oct. 10, 2000, at paras. 25-9.
89. See Sidabras and Dziautas v. Lithuania 2004-VIII; (2006) 42 EHRR 6 (see
Judge Thomassen); Budak v. Turkey Application No 57345/00, Decision of Sept. 7,
2004, at para. 4.
90. See, e.g., Luczak v. Poland Application No 77782/01, Judgment of Nov. 7,
2007, para. 48; Andrejeva v. Latvia Application No 55707/00, Judgment of Feb. 18,
2009; Aziz v. Cyprus 2004-V; Application No 69949/01, Judgment of June 22, 2004.
91. See Glor v. Switzerland Application No 13444/04, Judgment of Apr. 30, 2009,
at para. 80.
92. See Schwizgebel v. Switzerland Application No 25762/07, Judgment of June
10, 2010.
93. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom A 45 (1981); (1982) 4 EHRR 149; Salgueiro da
Silva Mouta c. Portugal 1999-IX; (2001) 31 EHRR 47; Frette´ v. France 2002-I; (2004)
38 EHRR 21; L. and v. v Austria 2003-I; (2003) 36 EHRR 55; E.B. v. France (2008) 47
EHRR 21.
94. Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom 2002-VI; (2002) 35 EHRR, at paras. 90-
93 (albeit not directly on grounds of Article 14 ECHR); I. v. UK Application No 25680/
94, Judgment of July 11, 2002; L. v. Lithuania Application No. 27527/03, Judgment of
Sept. 11, 2007; Van Ku¨ck v. Germany 2003-VII; (2003) 37 EHRR 51.
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ECtHR also considers cases of “discrimination by association.” These
are cases where the victim of the discrimination is not herself the
person with the protected characteristic but is closely related to
someone who has it, and is discriminated by reference to that other
person’s characteristic.95
In fact, some grounds are not only prohibited but considered sus-
pect classifications. This classification triggers heightened scrutiny
by the Court.96 This is the case for discrimination based on sex or
sexual orientation which requires very weighty reasons to be justi-
fied.97 Other grounds of discrimination such as birth out of wedlock,
nationality, religion and race may also trigger heightened scrutiny.98
In this respect, the ECtHR’s case law may be compared to that of the
U.S. Supreme Court which has developed various categories of sus-
pect classifications and corresponding levels of scrutiny; gender is
peculiar in this respect as it is not generally classified as a suspect
classification like race and only requires an intermediate level of
scrutiny by the U.S. Supreme Court.99
Article E 1996 ESC enumerates various grounds of discrimina-
tion borrowed from Article 14 ECHR and the 1961 ESC Preamble.
That list of prohibited grounds is only exemplary, however. Other
grounds not explicitly enumerated in the provision are also covered.
The ECSR has, for instance, added disability.100
In its recent case law on race, the ECSR has referred to “aggra-
vated violations” by reference to the ECtHR’s case law on racial
discrimination.101 There is an aggravated violation when, “on the one
hand, measures violating human rights specifically targeting and af-
fecting vulnerable groups are taken; on the other, public authorities
not only are passive and do not take appropriate action against the
perpetrators of these violations, but they also contribute to this vio-
lence.”102 This comes very close to turning race and ethnic origin into
suspect grounds of discrimination that trigger heightened scrutiny. It
95. See, e.g., Weller v. Hungary Application No 44399/05, Judgment of Mar. 31,
2009.
96. See Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. Royaume-Uni A 94 (1985); (1985) 7
EHRR 471, at para. 27.
97. See L and v. v Austria 2003-I; (2003) 36 EHRR 55 at para. 45.
98. See, e.g., Hoffmann v. Austria A 255 C (1993); (1994) 17 EHRR 293; Gaygusuz
v. Austria 1996-IV; (1997) 23 EHRR 364; DH and others v. Czech Republic [GC]
(2008) 47 EHRR 3, at paras. 203-04 (one may not renounce to the principle of the
prohibition of racial discrimination). Note on the ECtHR’s contrast between race and
language skills: Ors˘us˘ and others v. Croatia (2009) 49 EHRR 26, at para. 66.
99. See United States v. Virginia, 518 US 515, 116 S Ct 2264 (1996); Mississippi
University for Women v. Hogan, 458 US 718, 102 S Ct (1982).
100. Complaint No 13/2002, Autisme-Europe v. France, Nov. 4, 2003 (2004) 11
IHRR 843, at para. 52.
101. See Complaint No 58/2009, COHRE v. Italy, June 25, 2010, at para. 37, citing
ECtHR, Timishev v. Russia 2005-XII; (2007) 44 EHRR 37, at paras. 56-58.
102. Complaint No 58/2009, COHRE v. Italy, June 25, 2010, at paras. 75-76.
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remains to be seen whether this can be extended to other grounds of
discrimination under the ESC in the future.
4. Justifications
A differential treatment of comparable cases on prohibited
grounds is only discriminatory when it cannot be justified by objec-
tive reasons. Interestingly, some international law guarantees of the
principle of non-discrimination exclude the possibility to provide such
justifications. This is the case, for instance, for direct sex discrimina-
tion in EU law. Both the ECHR and ESC regimes, however, allow for
justification of direct and indirect discrimination, and on all grounds
(with the exception of the heightened scrutiny for some of them).
Although Article 14 ECHR does not expressly provide for justi-
fied restrictions, the ECtHR’s case law allows for objective and
reasonable justifications both in cases of direct and indirect discrimi-
nation.103 According to the ECtHR, “a distinction is discriminatory,
for the purposes of Article 14, if it “has no objective and reasonable
justification,” that is if it does not pursue a “legitimate aim” or if
there is no “reasonable relationship of proportionality between the
means employed and the aim sought to be realised.”104 Accordingly,
the two conditions for the justification of a prima facie discrimination
are: a legitimate aim and proportionality between that aim and the
means employed. The case law has not developed a precise test for
what a legitimate aim should be: it amounts at the most to a test of
reasonableness. Moreover, the Court often conflates the assessment
of the legitimate aim with the proportionality test.105
Mutatis mutandis, the same may be said about the ESC non-dis-
crimination regime. The Appendix to the 1996 ESC foresees that,
regarding Article E, “a differential treatment based on an objective
and reasonable justification shall not be deemed discriminatory.” The
ECSR’s case law has not provided a detailed account of the requisite
conditions, however.106
D. Procedural Elements
The procedural dimensions of the ECHR and ESC antidis-
crimination regimes reflect the fundamentally different roles and
approaches of the two European human rights bodies. Three procedu-
ral elements emerge from both systems and reflect those differences:
103. See Petrovic v. Austria 1998-II; (2001) 33 EHRR 14, at paras. 36-38.
104. Koua Poirrez v. France 2003-X; (2005) 40 EHRR 34, at para. 46; Burden v.
United Kingdom (2008) 47 EHRR 38, at para. 60.
105. See, e.g., Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. Royaume-Uni A 94 (1985);
(1985) 7 EHRR 471, at para. 88. See Martin, supra note 8, at 268-70.
106. See, e.g., Complaint No 6/1999, Syndicat national des professions de tourisme
v. France, Oct. 10, 2000, at paras. 25-29.
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evidence and burden of proof, level of scrutiny, and margin of
appreciation.
1. Evidence and Burden of Proof
The evidentiary requirements of discrimination concern the de-
gree to, and the manner in, which the allegation of an unjustified
differential treatment of comparable cases needs to be substantiated.
Closely connected to this question, the issue of the burden of proof
has been at the core of the development of non-discrimination law in
Europe since the beginning, as applicants are often hindered by the
difficulty to provide evidence of indirect or covert discrimination.
Both European regimes sometimes shift the burden of proof but the
ESC has done so for much longer and provides more detailed guide-
lines to States Parties relative to evidence and in particular to data
collection.
Under Article 14 ECHR, the evidentiary hurdles are high.107 In
principle, the ECtHR requires proof of discriminatory intent. In cer-
tain exceptional cases, the Court is satisfied with mere evidence of
practical discrimination,108 but the case should be made “beyond any
reasonable doubt.”109 Generally speaking, there are in principle no
accommodations made in the case of direct discrimination and the
burden of proof does not shift to the State even if proof of the likeli-
hood of discrimination has been provided. The ECtHR has not yet
recognized a specific accommodation of the burden of proof in cases of
direct discrimination based on the model of the EU non-discrimina-
tion directives (e.g., Article 19 Directive 2006/54/EC and Article 10
Directive 2000/78/EC). An exception may be found in the context of
racial discrimination where Article 14 ECHR is invoked together
with Article 2 or 3 ECHR. This practice has since been confirmed by
the Court.110
The same regime used to apply to indirect discrimination so that
evidence of the discriminatory intent was required here as well.111 In
107. See O.M. Arnardo´ttir, Non-Discrimination under Article 14 ECHR- the Bur-
den of Proof, 51 SCANDINAVIAN STUDIES IN LAW 13-40 (2007).
108. DH and others v. Czech Republic [GC] (2008) 47 EHRR 3, at para. 79.
109. See Velikova v. Bulgaria 2000-VI; Application No 41488/98, Judgment of May
8, 2000, at para. 94; Hugh Jordan v. United Kingdom 2001-III; (2003) 37 EHRR 2, at
para. 154. See Martin, supra note 8, at 251. Note that the Court may also apply strict
scrutiny to a case by virtue of the other provision at stake, and in particular with
respect to Article 3 ECHR (Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. Royaume-Uni A 94
(1985); (1985) 7 EHRR 471, at paras. 90-1).
110. See Nachova and others v. Bulgaria [GC] 2005-VII; (2006) 42 EHRR 43, at
paras. 156-57. See also Timishev v. Russia 2005-XII; (2007) 44 EHRR 37, at para. 39.
See D. Rosenberg, Enfin. . . le juge europe´en sanctionne les violations du principe de
non-discrimination raciale en relation avec le droit a` la vie, 61 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE
DES DROITS DE L’HOMME 171-202 (2005).
111. See Hugh Jordan v. United Kingdom 2001-III; (2003) 37 EHRR 2, at para.
154.
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recent cases, however, the European Court has gradually changed its
practice.112 Evidence of “the disproportionately prejudicial effect on a
particular group” now suffices to presume indirect discrimination.
This may be provided by undisputed official statistical evidence,113
but also through other means if the available sources are reliable.114
The Court further considers that once statistical evidence has been
supplied, the indirect discrimination is regarded as established and
the State has to provide an objective and proportional justification for
the discrimination rather than evidence of an absence of discrimina-
tory intent.115 Curiously, the Court sees the role of statistical
evidence as shifting the burden of proof, although it does not allow
the State to then offer evidence to reverse the presumption of indirect
discrimination except in order to justify the unfavorable treat-
ment.116 The exact role of statistical evidence and a clarification of
the distribution of the burden of proof remain to be provided by the
Court.
The evidence regime under Article E 1996 ESC is very similar.
Under Article E 1996 ESC, however, the Committee has recognized a
further duty of States Parties to collect data in order to help assess
the effectiveness of the non-discrimination principle and the integra-
tion of vulnerable groups.117 While States Parties have to respect
international law in the field (e.g., the self-identification requirement
that protects individuals against the stigmatization by census and
other forms of data collection),118 they cannot invoke privacy and
data protection to escape their duty to collect data. Where there are
legal obstacles to providing certain kinds of personal data, States
Parties are requested to provide other kinds of information.119
112. In the case of gender discrimination, see Hoogendijk v. Netherlands (2005) 40
EHRR SE 22, at para. 207; Opuz v. Turkey (2010) 50 EHRR 28, para. 198. In the case
of ethnic origin, see DH and others v. Czech Republic [GC] (2008) 47 EHRR 3, at para.
189.
113. Hoogendijk v. Netherlands (2005) 40 EHRR SE22, 207. See also DH and
others v. Czech Republic [GC] (2008) 47 EHRR 3, at para. 188.
114. Opuz v. Turkey (2010) 50 EHRR 28. See also Ors˘us˘ and Others v. Croatia
[GC] (2011) 52 EHRR 7, at paras. 152-53, 155.
115. On the use of statistical evidence to prove indirect discrimination, see Zarb
Adami v. Malte 2006-VIII; (2006) 44 EHRR 3, at paras. 78, 82-83; Opuz v. Turkey
(2010) 50 EHRR 28, para. 198 (indirect sex discrimination); DH and others v. Czech
Republic [GC] (2008) 47 EHRR 3, at paras. 179-80, 187-95; Ors˘us˘ and Others v. Croa-
tia [GC] (2011) 52 EHRR 7 (indirect race discrimination).
116. For a discussion, see Dubout, Vers une protection de l’e´galite´ “collective,” supra
note 7; and K. Heyden & A. von Ungern-Sternberg, Ein Diskriminierungsverbot ist
kein Fo¨rdergebot - Wider die neue Rechtsprechung des EGMR zu Art. 14 EMRK, 36: 5-
7 EUROPA¨ISCHE GRUNDRECHTSZEITSCHRIFT 81-89 (2009).
117. Complaint No 58/2009, COHRE v. Italy, June 25, 2010, at paras. 22-24 and
36.
118. See Complaint No 58/2009, COHRE v. Italy, June 25, 2010, at para. 119.
119. See Complaint No 15/2003, ERRC v. Greece, Dec. 8, 2005, (2006) 13 IHRR
895, at para. 27.
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The data provided by States Parties may then be used by appli-
cants to claim indirect discrimination, and by States Parties to
reverse the burden of proof and establish a presumption of indirect
discrimination based on statistical evidence or other kinds of infor-
mation.120 The ECSR indeed shifts the burden of proof when facts are
established by the applicant that lead to a presumption of discrimina-
tion. Thus, “when credible evidence is adduced alleging
discrimination, it becomes incumbent on the State Party concerned to
answer to the allegations by pointing to, for example, legislative or
other measures introduced, statistics and examples of relevant case
law.”121 The ECSR also requires States Parties to arrange for the
burden of proof to shift or at least to be alleviated under domestic
law.122
2. Level of Scrutiny
Once a prima facie case of discrimination has been made by the
applicant, the two European bodies need to assess whether the differ-
ential treatment can be justified. They can apply different levels of
scrutiny that will determine the weight of the requisite justifications
and the necessary degree of proportionality. The ECSR and the
ECtHR do not diverge a lot in this regard.
The ECtHR distinguishes, as we saw previously, between ordi-
nary and suspect grounds of discrimination. Gender, religion and
race, for instance, are classified among the latter and thus call for
heightened scrutiny. The Court requires “very weighty reasons” for a
differential treatment on grounds of sex, race or religion to be justi-
fied. The proportionality test is also more demanding in such
cases.123
There is no trace in the ESC and the ECSR’s practice of a varia-
ble level of scrutiny depending on the ground of discrimination. In its
recent case law, however, the ECSR has referred to “aggravated vio-
lations” by reference to the ECtHR’s case law on racial
discrimination.124 This comes very close to turning race and ethnic
origin into suspect grounds and hence to creating a level of height-
ened scrutiny.
120. Complaint No 58/2009, COHRE v. Italy, June 25, 2010, at paras. 22-24 and
36.
121. See Complaint No 15/2003, ERRC v. Greece, Dec. 8, 2005, (2006) 13 IHRR
895, at para. 50; Complaint No 41/2007, MDAC v. Bulgaria, June 3, 2008, para. 52.
122. See Conclusions 2002, Vol. I (Romania), 117-21.
123. See Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. Royaume-Uni A 94 (1985); (1985) 7
EHRR 471, at para. 78; Burghartz v. Switzerland A 280A (1994); (1994) 18 EHRR
101, at para. 27.
124. See Complaint No 58/2009, COHRE v. Italy, June 25, 2010, at para. 37, citing
ECtHR, Timishev v. Russia 2005-XII; (2007) 44 EHRR 37, at paras. 56-58.
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3. Margin of Appreciation
Because the two regimes compared, and the two institutions in
charge of interpreting them, are international, the question of the
margin of appreciation granted to the States Parties is important.
The ECSR has developed a more detailed approach than the ECtHR,
especially with respect to the limits on the margin of appreciation of
domestic authorities and on the option to invoke budgetary
restrictions.
Under Article 14 ECHR, and many other rights in the Conven-
tion, the ECtHR recognizes a broad margin of appreciation. The
explanation lies in the minimal and subsidiary nature of the Conven-
tion’s guarantees and especially of the ECtHR’s jurisdiction.125 As a
result, the margin of appreciation often dilutes the special protection
granted to sex, race or religion qua suspect classifications in the
ECtHR’s case law.126 Of course, the scope of the margin of apprecia-
tion will vary according to the circumstances, the subject matter and
its background. In this respect, one of the relevant factors may be the
existence or non-existence of common ground between the laws of the
Contracting States.127 In effect, the Court has turned the margin of
appreciation into a test of arbitrariness. This comes close to neutral-
izing and hence undermining the whole purpose of the heightened
scrutiny applicable to suspect grounds of discrimination like gender
or race.128
The ECSR also grants States Parties a broad margin of apprecia-
tion. This is another example of the procedural mechanisms borrowed
by the Committee from the ECHR.129 According to the Committee,
States enjoy a margin of appreciation in determining the steps to be
taken to ensure compliance with the Charter, in particular as regards
to the balance to be struck between the general interest and the in-
terest of a specific group and the choice which must be made in terms
125. See P. Lambert, Marge nationale d’appre´ciation et controˆle de proportionnal-
ite´, in L’INTERPRE´TATION DE LA CONVENTION EUROPE´ENNE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME 63-
89 (F. Sudre ed., 1998). See also Luzius Wildhaber, A Constitutional Future for the
European Court of Human Rights, 23 HUMAN RIGHTS LAW JOURNAL 161-65 (2002).
More generally on standards of review in the context of antidiscrimination law, see
Aalt Willem Heringa, Standards of Review for Discrimination, in NON-DISCRIMINA-
TION LAW: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 25-37 (Titia Loenen & Peter R. Rodriguez eds.,
1999).
126. See Petrovic v. Austria 1998-II; (2001) 33 EHRR 14, at para. 38.
127. See Petrovic v. Austria 1998-II; (2001) 33 EHRR 14, at para. 38; Abdulaziz,
Cabales and Balkandali v. Royaume-Uni A 94 (1985); (1985) 7 EHRR 471, at para. 78.
128. For a discussion, see M. Callewaert, Quel avenir pour la marge
d’appre´ciation?, in PROTECTION DES DROITS DE L’HOMME: LA PERSPECTIVE EUROPE´ENNE
– ME´LANGES A` LA ME´MOIRE DE ROLV RYSSDAL 147-66 (P. Mahoney, R. Matscher, H.
Petzold & L. Wildhaber eds., 2000).
129. See Malinverni, supra note 11.
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of priorities and resources.130 Interestingly, the ECSR monitors
States Parties’ margin of appreciation very closely and sets limits to
it.131 Thus, the margin will be narrower “where the right at stake is
crucial to the individual’s effective enjoyment of intimate or key
rights.”132 Further, when faced with budgetary restrictions, States
Parties must demonstrate that they have taken measures to achieve
the Charter’s objectives “within a reasonable time, with measurable
progression and to an extent consistent with the maximum use of
available resources.”133 This implies paying special attention to the
most vulnerable groups in each case, which is a key feature of the
ESC non-discrimination regime.134
III. SPECIAL FEATURES
The non-discrimination principle may protect against different
kinds of discrimination which themselves concretize different dimen-
sions of equality. Equality does not always require a symmetrical
treatment of equal situations, however. Asymmetrical equality in-
deed should also be protected as it may be the only way to take into
account specifically female or male circumstances or objective occupa-
tional requirements.
Further, equality may not only mean formal or legal, but also
material equality, i.e., equality in terms of results. Formal equality
may therefore have to be violated to ensure material equality in cer-
tain cases. As we will see, an example of instruments promoting
material equality would be positive or affirmative action measures.
One could also think of the adoption of special measures that do not
treat similar situations differently and hence do not violate formal
equality, but do accommodate differences in practice.
A. Symmetrical and Asymmetrical Equality
Equality is usually said to be symmetrical in the sense that peo-
ple deemed to be in comparable situations should be treated in
comparable ways and people in different situations in different ways.
In certain rare cases, however, people may be in a comparable situa-
tion (e.g., in terms of professional qualifications), but special features
or circumstances only apply to some of them (e.g., to women or men
only). This may be the case when women need special protection dur-
ing pregnancy and after giving birth and when they are accordingly
130. See Complaint No 31/2005, ERRC v. Bulgaria, Oct. 18, 2006, (2008) 15 IHRR
895, at para. 35.
131. See Complaint No 50/2008, CFDT v. France, Sept. 29, 2009, at para. 39.
132. See Complaint No 58/2009, COHRE v. Italy, June 25, 2010, at para. 119, cit-
ing ECtHR, Connors v. United Kingdom (2005) 40 EHRR 189, at para. 82.
133. See Complaint No 13/2002, Autisme-Europe v. France, Nov. 4, 2003, (2004) 11
IHRR 843, at para. 52.
134. See de Schutter, supra note 13, at 70.
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treated differently from men, or when men are by virtue of their
physical constitution more able to fit certain occupational require-
ments and are therefore treated differently from women. Both
European regimes are similar in this context, although it took longer
for the ECHR non-discrimination regime to generate duties in cases
of assymmetrical equality.
Under Article 14 ECHR, equality seems to be largely understood
in symmetrical terms. Yet, certain decisions in the ECtHR’s case law
testify to an asymmetrical approach. This is the case, for instance, in
the context of pregnancy and child-care135 or of military service.136 In
this respect, there used to be a higher propensity for the Court to
respect Contracting States’ margin of appreciation when the appli-
cants were men rather than women.137 While the asymmetrical
approach in the ECtHR’s case law did have a paternalistic and tradi-
tional flavor as a result, the Court has recently clearly changed its
approach; it has indeed identified a new consensus among States Par-
ties on those issues.138
Based on its collective and social dimension, the ESC’s regime of
non-discrimination has always clearly endorsed an assymmetrical
approach to equality. This has been the case in the context of gender
discrimination, in particular, but also of disability. The Committee
focuses on tackling disadvantages and on remedying structural ine-
qualities experienced by specifically vulnerable groups, and this may
require adopting an asymmetrical approach.139
B. Formal and Material Equality
There can be cases where people are equally situated formally
and where there are no specific features or circumstances that re-
quire an asymmetrical treatment either, but where a special
treatment is necessary to redress past material or formal discrimina-
tions and hence to ensure present material equality. Duties to
promote material equality may include obligations to engage in posi-
tive or affirmative action, but also more broadly to adopt any special
135. See Petrovic v. Austria 1998-II; (2001) 33 EHRR 14, at para. 38; Weller v.
Hungary Application No 44399/05, Judgment of Mar. 31, 2009.
136. See Asnar v. France Application No 57030/00, Judgment of June 17, 2003;
Konstantin Markin v. Russia Application No 30078/06, Judgment of Oct. 7, 2010.
137. See, e.g., Petrovic v. Austria 1998-II; (2001) 33 EHRR 14, at paras. 42-43; As-
nar v. France Application No 57030/00, Judgment of June 17, 2003, at para. 28.
138. See Konstantin Markin v. Russia Application No 30078/06, Judgment of Oct.
7, 2010, at para. 49; Weller v. Hungary Application No 44399/05, Judgment of Mar.
31, 2009, at paras. 33-35. See Besson, supra note 8; F. Tulkens, Droits de l’homme,
droits des femmes: les reque´rantes devant la Cour europe´enne des Droits de l’Homme,
in LIBER AMICORUM LUZIUS WILDHABER: HUMAN RIGHTS, STRASBOURG VIEWS 423-45
(Lucius Caflisch et al. eds., 2007).
139. See Complaint No 15/2003, ERRC v. Greece, Dec. 8, 2005, (2006) 13 IHRR
895, at para. 42.
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measures that may help to protect and promote equality positively
and prevent discrimination in practice.
1. Positive Action
Affirmative or positive action measures exemplify the require-
ments of material equality. Both European regimes are similar in
this context, although it took longer for the ECHR non-discrimination
regime to allow positive action.
When read strictly, Article 14 ECHR, at least in its French ver-
sion, would seem to exclude material equality and especially positive
action. It states that the rights in the Convention should be exercised
without any “discrimination” (“sans distinction aucune”). The ECtHR
soon stated, however, that this provision should be understood
broadly to encompass material as much as formal equality.140 In Stec,
the Court held that “Article 14 does not prohibit a Member State from
treating groups differently in order to correct ‘factual inequalities’ be-
tween them.”141 Although there have only been few cases so far,142
positive action schemes may therefore be compatible with Article 14
ECHR if an objective and reasonable justification can be provided.
This has actually been confirmed in the Preamble to Protocol 12
which “[r]eaffirm[s] that the principle of non-discrimination does not
prevent States Parties from taking measures in order to promote full
and effective equality, provided that there is an objective and reason-
able justification for those measures.” The ECtHR has not yet
recognized a duty to adopt positive action measures, however. The
initial reluctance of the Court in this context may be explained by
reference to the subsidiary nature of the ECtHR’s control and the
broad margin of appreciation it accords to States Parties.
By contrast to Article 14 ECHR, the ESC non-discrimination re-
gime has always been conceived as protecting not only formal but
also material and effective equality.143 The positive duty to take ac-
tion to protect equality “in practice”144 goes well beyond that under
the ECHR regime. The Charter does not offer general recognition of
the admissibility of positive action, however. The closest the Charter
comes is to clarify, in Part II of the Appendix to the 1996 ESC, that
140. Cases relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in educa-
tion in Belgium A 6 (1968); (1979-80) 1 EHRR 252, at para. 10. See also Dubout, Vers
une protection de l’e´galite´ “collective,” supra note 7.
141. Stec and others v. United Kingdom 2005-X; (2005) 41 EHRR 18, para. 51.
142. See, e.g., Wintersberger v. Austria (friendly settlement) Application No 57448/
00, Judgment of Feb. 5, 2004. See Dubout, Vers une protection de l’e´galite´ “collective,”
supra note 7, at 870-82.
143. Complaint No 31/2005, ERRC v. Bulgaria, Oct. 18, 2006, (2008) 15 IHRR 895,
para. 42; Complaint No 13/2002, Autisme-Europe v. France, Nov. 4, 2003, (2004) 11
IHRR 843, at para. 52.
144. See, e.g., Conclusions XVI-II, Vol. 2, 2003, (Spain), Article 1 Additional Proto-
col, p. 939.
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the prohibition on sex discrimination “shall not prevent the adoption
of specific measures aimed at removing de facto inequalities.” Accord-
ing to the Committee, such positive action cannot be considered
prohibited discrimination. It may even be considered a requirement
of equality in certain circumstances.145 The ECSR has not yet fleshed
out, however, what the precise conditions for legitimate positive ac-
tion could be.
2. Special Measures
Recently, European non-discrimination law has started to in-
clude positive duties to promote equality, both on the part of public
authorities and, although to a lesser extent, of individuals. One often
refers to them, in international human rights law, as duties to adopt
special measures. These duties, when they apply to persons such as
employers, are sometimes referred to as duties of reasonable accom-
modation.146 The concept is relatively new in the ECHR non-
discrimination system, but has always been central to the ECSR’s ju-
risprudence, and the latter’s elaborate regime of positive duties of
equality has had a key influence on the recent ECtHR’s case law in
the area.
Under the ECHR, the notion of positive duties to promote equal-
ity has only recently emerged in the interpretation of Article 14. This
is surprisingly late given the ECtHR’s very advanced case law on pos-
itive human rights duties in general.147 A technical explanation may
lie in the lack of independence of Article 14 in the Convention, and in
the subsidiarity of the ECtHR’s control more generally. The same can
be said a fortiori about duties of reasonable accommodation148 given
the lack of direct private duties under the ECHR. Yet another expla-
nation may lie in the collective and social dimension of special
measures and hence in the ECtHR’s resistance to venture too far into
the social field.149 The application of Protocol 12 ECHR in this con-
text may avoid most of those difficulties since it extends the scope of
the ECHR non-discrimination principle to any substantive rights in-
145. Complaint No 31/2005, ERRC v. Bulgaria, Oct. 18, 2006, (2008) 15 IHRR 895,
at para. 29.
146. See, e.g., E. Bribosia, Ame´nager la diversite´: le droit de l’e´galite´ face a` la
pluralite´ religieuse, 79 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME 319-73 (2009).
147. See also de Schutter, supra note 69.
148. See, e.g., on reasonable accommodation: Jako´bski v. Poland Application No
18429/06, Judgment of Dec. 7, 2010.
149. This is particularly striking with respect to positive duties in the disability
context if one compares ECtHR, Botta v. Italia 1998-I; (1998) 26 EHRR 241 with
ECSR, Complaint No 13/2002, Autisme-Europe v. France, Nov. 4, 2003, (2004) 11
IHRR 843. See also Sudre, supra note 7, at 764; J-M. Larralde, La Convention
europe´enne des droits de l’homme et la protection de groupes particuliers, 56 REVUE
TRIMESTRIELLE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME 1247-74 (2003); Quinn, supra note 8.
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cluding ESC rights.150 Yet, so far the Court has been reluctant to use
Protocol 12 or at, least, to use it differently from Article 14.
True, the Court had already recognized positive duties to protect
the lifestyle of the Roma population stemming from Article 8 ECHR
in the Chapman case.151 According to the Court in Thlimmenos, “dis-
crimination may arise where States without an objective and
reasonable justification fail to treat differently persons whose situa-
tions are significantly different.”152 In the Stec and DH and Others
cases, the Court went one step further and stated that “in certain
circumstances a failure to attempt to correct inequality through dif-
ferent treatment may in itself give rise to a breach of the article.”153
The Court distinguished between two understandings of indirect dis-
crimination: it is one thing to recognize, as it had in the past, a
violation of Article 14 ECHR due to the indirect discrimination of
Roma children resulting from school tests and requiring that those
school tests be adapted to accommodate those children in the fu-
ture154 but another to recognize a violation of Article 14 ECHR due to
the violation of a positive duty to accommodate and promote material
equality at school. This is a nuance that has since been abandoned by
the ECtHR in the Ors˘us˘ decision. In that case, the Court established
a duty to adopt special measures in cases where their omission would
amount to indirect discrimination.155 What constituted a case of dis-
crimination there was not so much that the Roma children had been
treated worse than others due to their differences as in the DH and
Others case, but that they had not been treated well enough.156 The
contours of those positives duties under the ECHR non-discrimina-
tion principle remain to be clarified, especially in relation to
conflicting individual rights.
By contrast, the ESC non-discrimination regime has always been
conceived as protecting not only formal but also material and effec-
tive equality. As a result, both the 1961 ESC and the 1996 ESC have
imposed positive duties on States Parties that go beyond those im-
posed by Article 14 ECHR and Protocol 12 ECHR.157 More
specifically, States are required not only to adopt a legal framework
150. See also Sudre, supra note 7, at 773.
151. Chapman v. United Kingdom 2001-I; (2001) 33 EHRR 18, 95-96.
152. Thlimmenos v. Greece 2000-IV; (2001) 31 EHRR 15, 44.
153. Stec and others v. United Kingdom 2005-X; (2005) 41 EHRR 18, 51. For a
confirmation, see DH and others v. Czech Republic [GC] (2008) 47 EHRR 3, at paras.
181-83. For a critique, see Heyden & von Ungern-Sternberg, supra note 116.
154. See DH and others v. Czech Republic [GC] (2008) 47 EHRR 3, at paras. 198,
207.
155. See Ors˘us˘ and Others v. Croatia [GC] (2011) 52 EHRR 7. See also Dubout, La
Cour europe´enne des droits de l’homme et la justice sociale, supra note 7, 990.
156. See Dubout, La Cour europe´enne des droits de l’homme et la justice sociale,
supra note 7, at 1006.
157. See Complaint No 31/2005, ERRC v. Bulgaria, Oct. 18, 2006, (2008) 15 IHRR
895, at para. 35.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\COM\60-1\COM108.txt unknown Seq: 31 22-DEC-11 13:24
2012]NON-DISCRIMINATION WITHIN THE ECHR & THE ESC SYSTEMS 177
prohibiting discrimination, but also to ensure that this framework is
effective (e.g., through monitoring) and, finally, that policy measures
are adopted, beyond merely legal ones, to promote integration and
the effective prohibition of discrimination (e.g., through reasonable
accommodation158).159 It follows that States Parties are not only au-
thorized to adopt positive measures to promote equality and combat
discrimination of vulnerable groups, but that they are also required
to do so with the aim of achieving the social integration of these
groups.160 Failure to take into account relevant differences and to
provide remedial positive action or special measures is actually con-
stitutive of indirect discrimination.161 According to the Committee,
indirect discrimination may indeed arise “by failing to take due and
positive account of all relevant differences or by failing to take ade-
quate steps to ensure that the rights and collective advantages that
are open to all are genuinely accessible by and to all.”162
The ESC imposes an obligation of result, and not just of means,
on States Parties. As a result, attempts to comply with the principle
do not suffice, and the Committee requires explanations as to why
the problem of discrimination is not resolved.163 Of course, as men-
tioned before, States Parties have a margin of appreciation when
determining what kind of special measures to take.164 Interestingly,
the ECSR goes further than the ECtHR in its directives to States
Parties in that respect, especially in view of the invocation of limited
available resources.165 In such cases States Parties must show that
they have taken measures to achieve the Charter’s objectives “within
a reasonable time, with measurable progression and to an extent con-
sistent with them maximum use of available resources.”166
C. Harassment
A newcomer concept in European non-discrimination law is har-
assment. The concept fits uneasily with the different elements of the
158. See Conclusions 2008, Vol. 2 (Moldova), Article 15, p. 599.
159. See, e.g., de Schutter, supra note 69; de Schutter, supra note 13; Quinn, supra
note 8 in the context of disability.
160. See, e.g., Conclusions 2003, Vol. 1 (Article 15).
161. See Complaint No 41/2007, MDAC v. Bulgaria, June 3, 2008, at para. 51.
162. See Complaint No 15/2003, ERRC v. Greece, Dec. 8, 2005, (2006) 13 IHRR
895, at para. 52.
163. See Complaint No 1/1998, ICJ v. Portugal, Sept. 9, 1999, (1999) 6 IHRR 1142,
para. 40. See also de Schutter, supra note 3, at 35.
164. See Complaint No 31/2005, ERRC v. Bulgaria, Oct. 18, 2006, (2008) 15 IHRR
895, at para. 35.
165. See Complaint No 13/2002, Autisme-Europe v. France, Nov. 4, 2003, (2004) 11
IHRR 843, at para. 52. See also Aoife Nolan, “Aggravated Violations,” Roma Housing
Rights and Forced Expulsions in Italy: Recent Developments under the European So-
cial Charter Collective Complaints System, 11:2 HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW 343-61,
358 (2011).
166. See Complaint No 13/2002, Autisme-Europe v. France, Nov. 4, 2003, (2004) 11
IHRR 843, at para. 52.b.
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equality and non-discrimination regime presented so far. Both Euro-
pean regimes, however, have accommodated harassment within their
system.
While the ECHR does not specifically prohibit harassment or in-
struction to discriminate, it does contain particular rights that relate
to the same area. Where harassing acts display a discriminatory mo-
tive, the ECtHR will examine the alleged breaches of the relevant
rights in conjunction with Article 14 ECHR.167 The notion that comes
closest to harassment would be inhuman and degrading treatment
prohibited under Article 3 ECHR and the related ECtHR case law.168
There have been recent cases such as Bekos or Nachova in which Ar-
ticle 3 has been deemed violated in circumstances where the
motivation for the (violent or non-violent) inhuman or degrading
treatment was racially motivated and hence potentially discrimina-
tory as well.169 In other cases, the Court has not based its reasoning
on those grounds but on the right to respect for private and family life
protected under Article 8 ECHR, although the parties invoked har-
assment in their submissions under both Articles 3 and 14 ECHR.170
In the Osman case, Article 8 ECHR was invoked in a case of harass-
ment, but there was no discriminatory motivation.171 Developments
in EU law may, however, trigger a further reaction on the part of the
ECtHR.
The ESC’s non-discrimination regime does not explicitly cover
harassment as a form of discrimination either. Yet, it follows from
the ECSR’s conclusions that harassment qua form of unequal treat-
ment ought to be prohibited and repressed in the same way as other
acts of discrimination, even if not all forms of harassment are acts of
discrimination.172 Moreover, the Committee allows States Parties to
presume by law that harassment is a form of discrimination.
167. See, e.g., Baczkowski and Others v. Poland Application No 1543/06, Judgment
of May 3, 2007; Paraskeva Todorova v. Bulgaria Application No 37193/07, Judgment
of Mar. 25, 2010.
168. See, e.g., for a joint application of Article 3 and 14 ECHR: Abdulaziz, Cabales
and Balkandali v. Royaume-Uni A 94 (1985); (1985) 7 EHRR 471, at paras. 90-91.
169. Nachova and others v. Bulgaria [GC] 2005-VII; (2006) 42 EHRR 43, at paras.
158-61; Bekos and Koutropoulos v. Greece 2005-XIII; (2006) 43 EHRR 22, at paras.
69-70.
170. In Smith and Grady v. United Kingdom 1999-VI; (2000) 29 EHRR 493, the
Court has not recognized the existence of torture under Article 3 ECHR, with or with-
out a violation of Article 14 ECHR. And in Vincent v. France Application No 6253/03,
Judgment of Oct. 24, 2006, the Court has recognized torture under Article 3 ECHR,
but without a violation of Article 14 ECHR (the parties did not invoke harassment
specifically either).
171. Osman v. United Kingdom 1998-VIII; (1998) 29 EHRR 245.
172. See Conclusions 2010, Vol. 1 (Andora), Article 26, p. 78. See also Conclusions
2003, Vol. 1 (Bulgaria), Article 26, p. 90.
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CONCLUSIONS
In recent years, the case law of the ECtHR and the ECSR have
contributed in a decisive fashion to the shaping of European non-dis-
crimination law. This has been the case not only in the quantitative
sense: half of the ECtHR’s case law on discrimination was generated
in the last five years or so and the ECSR receives increasingly more
collective complaints pertaining to discrimination. It is also true in
the qualitative sense as the two European human rights’ bodies have
lately addressed some of the most difficult issues raised in non-dis-
crimination law. Suffice it here to mention the ECSR’s refined
jurisprudence on positive duties to implement group equality and the
ECtHR’s detailed case law on indirect discrimination and its relation-
ship to individual rights.
Given the two conventions’ complementarity in the history of the
Council of Europe, and, perhaps most importantly, the two institu-
tions’ joint contribution to the non-discrimination law applicable
within the European Union, clarifying the convergences and diver-
gences between those two parallel bodies of case law is an important
task which is still largely incomplete. As a matter of fact, both insti-
tutions have already started drawing on each other’s decisions even
though not always in a systematic way. As I explained before, the
principle of non-discrimination is a pivotal or bridging principle
within international human rights law and in particular a principle
that reveals the social or collective dimension of individual human
rights. It should not come as a surprise that it is in the non-discrimi-
nation context that the two European human rights institutions,
with their respective social and individual rights mandates, converge
most or, at least, have the potential to do so.
As one may have expected from a non-judicial and more recent
institution, it is the ECSR that mainly cites to the ECtHR and not
vice-versa. This may also be explained by the ECtHR’s reluctance to
venture into the social field in spite of the entry into force of Protocol
12 ECHR and, conversely, by the inherently social and collective di-
mension of non-discrimination that ties in perfectly with the ECSR’s
mandate. Among the substantive areas most in need of coordination
on the part of the ECtHR, one should mention positive duties, and
positive or affirmative action in particular. The ECSR has a well-es-
tablished case law on positive duties to promote the equality and
integration of vulnerable groups, and the ECtHR could benefit from
that now that it has recognized the positive duty to accommodate dif-
ferences in certain circumstances. Another key feature of the ECSR’s
case law is its purposive and practical approach to discrimination and
the value-based interpretation of the principle of non-discrimination
that has been lacking in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence. Procedurally,
there is also much to learn from the ECSR’s jurisprudence on the
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burden of proof and the collection of statistical data and other forms
of gauging the impact of antidiscrimination measures. Of course,
there would also be room for borrowing more from the ECtHR’s non-
discrimination case law in the interpretation of the ESC. One exam-
ple would be the greater autonomy of the non-discrimination
principle in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, since that principle may be
deemed violated outside cases of violation of other substantive rights.
Besides those substantive arguments for more coherence, the
embryonic implementation of Protocol 12 ECHR actually makes the
coordination between the ECtHR’s and the ECSR’s approaches to
non-discrimination legally necessary. Since the entry into force of the
Protocol, ESC rights belong to the material scope of application of the
ECHR non-discrimination principle just as any other substantive
rights applying in the domestic case. ESC rights may therefore have
to be interpreted by the ECtHR when applying Protocol 12, and no
longer only by the ECSR. This could give rise to competing interpre-
tations of ESC rights and their relationship to the non-discrimination
principle. But, of course, just as the current regime is the result of
mutual borrowings and years of intentional convergence, closer coop-
eration will require not only more political will on the part of States
Parties but also a clear policy on the part of the two European human
rights bodies. After all, it does take two to tango.
